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The welfare costs of urban outdoor water 
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Outdoor water restrictions are usually implemented as bans on a particular type of
watering technology (sprinklers), which allow households to substitute for labour-
intensive (hand-held) watering. This paper presents a household production model
approach to analysing the impact of sprinkler restrictions on consumer welfare and
their efﬁcacy as a demand management tool. Central to our empirical analysis is an
experimentally derived production function which describes the relationship between
irrigation and lawn quality. We demonstrate that for a typical consumer complete
sprinkler bans may be little more effective than milder restrictions policies, but are








Restricting the use of sprinklers for irrigating lawns and gardens is the most
common drought management strategy used by urban water utilities in
Australia. Backyard irrigation makes up at least half of all water consumed
by the household sector in most Australian capital cities, and outdoor water
restrictions create a signiﬁcant opportunity for reducing demand during
droughts, in a country that encounters greater climatic variability than any




. 1992). Water utilities use stringent decision
rules regarding the implementation of water restrictions, which include a
quantitative measure of shortage (such as volume held in dams) that triggers
implementation of water restrictions of varying severity. For example, Perth
consumers have been restricted to using sprinklers only two days per week
for the last ﬁve summers, consumers in Brisbane, Sydney, and in many
regional centres were placed on complete sprinkler bans in the last one or
two summers. Recent experience with a prolonged drought has meant that
outdoor water restrictions of varying degrees of severity are currently
impacting on more than 75 per cent of all households in Australia, and there
is some concern that climate change will mean that restrictions become the
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basis of recently dry climate rather than historic climate, there seems to be a policy
consensus that it is better to have two day per week restrictions permanently
in place than to run the risk of a less frequent but more severe sprinkler ban.
Aside from droughts, the dynamics of urban water demand and supply
mean that outdoor water restrictions also offer ﬂexibility to long-term invest-
ment decisions. Urban water utilities in growing cities face an increasing demand
for water over time, which is generally met by lumpy supply augmentation
opportunities such as building new dams, sourcing new underground supplies
or constructing desalination plants. One option that the utility has is to use
temporary rationing of available supplies in order to defer augmentation.
The question of supply reliability – as measured by the risk of sprinkler bans
– was considered explicitly in recent deliberations regarding augmentation options
for the city of Canberra (ACTEW Corporation 2004). The economic regulator
in Western Australia has questioned the timing of proposed augmentation of the
urban water supply there, challenging the reliability targets set by the water utility
which chose to build a desalination plant in order to keep the risk of complete
sprinkler bans to 1 in 200 years (Economic Regulation Authority 2005).
Despite the importance of outdoor water demand in terms of total urban
water use, and the role of restrictions in managing shortfalls in supply and in
determining the timing of longer term supply decisions, there has been little
attention paid by economists to the nature of the consumer problem. Yet the
question of restricting outdoor water demand is a classic economic rationing
problem, which could be approached through direct rationing measures
including price policy and household level water allocations, or through
indirect means that target water-using technologies, such as sprinkler bans or
subsidies on water efﬁcient appliances. One of the main problems associated
with direct rationing is the difﬁculty in distinguishing between indoor and
outdoor consumption drawn from a single metering point at the household
level, and the high degree of heterogeneity in the size of the more inelastic
indoor demand component. In contrast, the outdoor water restrictions via
regulations on irrigation method (including time of day, days per week and
sprinkler vs. hose vs. watering can) allows the more discretionary component
of demand to be targeted and is therefore both easier to implement and con-
sidered to be more palatable to politicians.
One of the difﬁculties associated with analysing the welfare impacts of
urban water restrictions is the lack of primary data to study the determinants
of household water consumption and the effect of demand-side management
policies on that consumption. A number of studies have used econometric
analysis of panel data obtained by combining household water consumption
data from water utilities, with household characteristics data derived from
surveys or secondary data, in order to assess the efﬁcacy of different types of
drought management policies and their distributional implications (e.g. Renwick
and Archibald 1998; Renwick and Green 2000; Schuck and Proﬁt 2004; Garcia-
Valinas 2006). Other studies have examined whether there is any evidence of
a demand response to general conservation programs which may include 
Welfare costs of sprinkler restrictions 245
 
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 
policies such as advertising, retroﬁtting indoor appliances, as well as outdoor
restrictions. (e.g. Nieswiadomy 1992). Recent work in Australia has used
stated preference techniques to explicitly address the question of willingness










150 per year to have a more ‘voluntary based’ demand management
approach (including incentive schemes for grey water recycling and efﬁciency
regulations on new buildings) rather than mandatory restrictions aimed at




. (2006) found that




239 extra on their water bills to move
from complete sprinkler restrictions that apply every day and last all year to
a situation where there are no restrictions at all. Whilst the results of these
studies are useful for assessing optimal timing of supply augmentation
because they allow the cost of sprinkler bans to be quantiﬁed, they do not
allow investigation of the role of alternative demand management strategies
on consumer welfare nor on the efﬁcacy of the management tool.
Since restrictions on the use of sprinklers are an indirect means of rationing
water use, they are likely to be inefﬁcient and only partially effective as long
as there are substitution options available. Most sprinkler-restrictions policies
allow consumers to use a hand-held hose to water their lawns and gardens,
and restrictions on sprinklers will invoke substitution for this more labour-
intensive technology if the disutility from garden water-stress is large enough.
Such substitution will affect the efﬁcacy of the restriction policy in reducing
overall water use and the welfare cost of the policy. The fact that Sydney and
Brisbane utilities have had to revise sprinkler-restrictions policies to also ban
the use of hand-held hoses provides support to the notion that labour substi-
tution can occur when there are sprinkler restrictions in place. However, the
relationship between effectiveness of a restrictions policy and its impact on
consumer welfare is unknown. Yet this question is fundamental in determin-
ing the optimal timing, duration and severity of outdoor water restrictions
policies which in turn impacts upon longer term investment in urban supply.
This paper seeks to provide an analysis of the trade-off between consumer
welfare and efﬁcacy of outdoor water restrictions by calibrating a household
production model of the consumer choice to substitute between leisure and
lawn quality. Household production models are typically used in labour





and Kooreman 2003); or in agricultural development to study semi-subsistence




. 1992; de Janvry and Sadoulet
2001). The key feature of the approach is that it allows the incorporation of
choices regarding the allocation of labour between production of ‘home-
produced’ goods and leisure. In the present case the home-produced good is
‘lawn quality’ which is affected by sprinkler restrictions but the household
can choose to substitute leisure for hand-watering and thus maintain quality.
By adopting this approach we can directly incorporate available information
regarding the ‘lawn quality production function’ to asses the efﬁcacy of different 
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water management policies, including pricing, sprinkler days, lawn variety
and irrigation technology.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, a conceptual
model of consumer preference for outdoor water use is presented using the
‘household production model’ approach, where demand for water is an input
into the production of lawn quality, a consumer good. The calibration of the
conceptual model is then presented, which includes a discussion of an empirical
production relationship between water use and lawn quality, and other
characteristics of the ‘cost function’ for lawn quality. The model is used to
examine the response of a range of representative consumers (distinguished
according to preference for greenness) to outdoor water restrictions of varying
severity. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for future
research in this area.
 
2. The conceptual model
 
We focus our attention on the irrigation lawn over the summer months in this
analysis. In the traditional Australian suburban home, lawns make up a
major proportion of irrigation demand, both because of the higher water
requirement (lawns require twice as much water per square meter as garden
beds, Water Corporation 2006) and because grassed area typically takes up a
large proportion of the landscaped area of the suburban property. Decisions
regarding the irrigation of lawn in the short run affect the general appearance
of the lawn, which are reversible in the longer run when restrictions are lifted.
Southern Australia is characterised by dominant winter–spring rainfall,
which means that demand for irrigation is highest in summer, and restrictions
are usually put into place at the beginning of a summer with little prospect of
being lifted for the rest of the summer. Our attention on the short run implies
that the opportunities for longer run adjustments to an increased risk of
sprinkler bans, which might include for example reducing lawn area, changing
to lower-water-using varieties, are excluded from the analysis. These longer
term adjustments will reduce the disutility associated with sprinkler restrictions
beyond the short-run impacts we assess here, where the assumed consumer
goal is to achieve a certain level of lawn quality, given that the consumer is in
equilibrium regarding long-term decisions about garden design including
lawn size and variety.
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goods purchased in the short run, and a separable utility function with
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. The indirect utility function
















  is the
Lagrange multiplier for the time constraint.
In the absence of sprinkler restrictions, the welfare-maximising conditions




As long as the marginal utility from water application is greater than the cost
of application, then sprinkler irrigation will be applied, and the ﬁrst con-
dition in Equation (3) will be met as an equality. In contrast, Equation (4) will






 > 0. That is, as long as there is disutility
from foregoing leisure to undertake hand-held watering, all watering will be
done by sprinkler irrigation. It can be seen that our functional form assumes
there is no utility derived directly from allocating time to hand-watering, and
the cost of restrictions is the foregone leisure associated with hand-watering.
Data from a household survey conducted prior to restrictions found that
34 per cent of respondents derived enjoyment from hand-watering, but only





2002). For cases where consumers do view hand-held watering as a leisure
activity, our approach would imply that we need to further nest the leisure
allocation decision between hand-held watering and other activities. The decision
to water by hand in the absence of restrictions may imply a combinations of
factors including ample leisure time, the perception of watering as a leisure
activity, a low preference for greenness and a small garden. However, given
the substantial time commitment required to water lawns only by hand
over the summer months there is likely to be some opportunity cost in terms
of foregone leisure for the typical suburban block. We can examine the
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impact of leisure preferences for hand-held watering by varying the opportu-
nity cost of time.
Introducing water restrictions imposes an additional constraint 












If a consumer is using sprinklers prior to restrictions, then Equation (6) will
be met as an equality, and it is possible that Equation (8) may also be met as
an equality. Combining Equations (6) and (7) this will occur as long as:
(8)
Equation (8) states that hand-held watering will occur if the disutility from
expending leisure time on hand-held watering, measured in per unit of water







). The conditions under which this will be satisﬁed include a






, larger productivity of labour with

















  include the productivity of
water in producing greenness and the consumer preference for greenness.
 
3. Calibration of the model
3.1 Greenness production model
 
The relationship between water application and the greenness of the lawn
was derived from the results of experimental studies conducted in Perth over
three consecutive summers for 11 turf species (Colmer and Short 2001; Short
2002). Measurements included lawn ‘greenness’, the mass of clippings obtained
from mowing and meteorological data, such as daily rainfall and water (pan)
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evaporation rate. The irrigation regimes were characterised by the amount of
water applied, expressed as a percentage of daily pan evaporation, and the
application frequency, for example, daily or every second day. Greenness was
measured using a chromo-meter to measure the colour of each irrigation




* green–magenta colour coordinate) and is




* value for the control, being the same species of
turf irrigated at 100 per cent of daily pan evaporation, which represents lush
turf with no water stress. Thus greenness of 100 per cent implies a healthy
green canopy while 0 per cent greenness means a yellow–brown dead appear-
ance. They measured greenness over the course of the summer; we used the
end of summer values for Buffalo species, one of the most common varieties
used in Perth. Data for irrigation treatments representing 30, 40, 50, 60 and
100 per cent pan evaporation were used to estimate a production function













). Figure  1 shows that Equation (9) describes well the
greenness–irrigation data of Colmer and Short (2001).
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The amount of labour required to water by hand, deﬁned as κ in Equation
(2), determined by the system ﬂow rate, and is 1.8  kL/h. Table  1 lists the
parameter values for Equation (10) used in this study.
3.2 The cost of lawn greenness
The cost of producing and maintaining lawn greenness is made of up water
costs and maintenance costs. Lawn maintenance cost generally comprises
mowing, fertilising and weeding. Colmer and Short’s (2001) experimental
Table 1 Parameters used in model calibration
Equation 10
Epan 0.799 m December to February total class A pan 
evaporation for Bureau of Meteorology’s 
Perth Metro station, averaged over ﬁve 
summers, 2000/01–2004/05†. Pan 
evaporation is a standard measure that 
reﬂects the amount of water which would 
evaporate from an open pan of water
Lawn size A 170 m‡ Assumed lawn area derived from analysing 
survey data referred to in ARCWIS (2002)






#241 Based on weed, feed and mowing costs for 
a typical suburban lawn‡
2 days per week 
restrictions lawn 
maintenance
#193 Saving due to reduced frequency of 
mowing, from weekly to fortnightly
Water price #0.91/kL Marginal price at water consumption of 
typical suburban block, based on ARCWIS 
(2002) consumption data and Water 
Corporation’s inclining block tariff§
Cost of watering, cw #2.39/kL Marginal cost of lawn maintenance, 
#1.48/kL plus the cost of water
Expenditure per 
summer other than 
lawns, # per household
#5511 Derived from ABS (2005)













Baseline water use 
on lawns (kL)
92 138 46




Sources: †http://www.nrm.qld.gov.au/silo/, ‡Based on interviews Terry Solomon, Floreat Lawn Services
(2006); Benjamin Mustard, Evergreen Turf Farm (2006), §http://www.watercorporation.com.au/A/
accounts_rates_metro_res.cfm.Welfare costs of sprinkler restrictions 251
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data on volume of grass clippings in relation to irrigation treatment revealed
a linear relationship between water and production, so we assumed a linear
relationship between irrigation and mowing cost. We interviewed a turf pro-
duction company and a mowing company to develop cost assumptions for
lawn maintenance at two levels of irrigation, based on pre-restrictions
experience and the current ‘two day per week’ water restrictions (Terry
Solomon and Benjamin Mustard, pers. comm., 2006), and then estimated a
straight-line relationship as a function of irrigation. These data are reported
in Table 1. The total unit cost of water is the sum of these lawn-maintenance
costs and the direct price of water. Perth consumers face inclining block
tariffs, and marginal water costs vary between #0.45 and #1.2/kL, depending
on the total level of household consumption. We used a marginal price of
#0.91/kL which is the price that is likely to be paid by a consumer with an
average sized household and the garden watering quantities we analyse in
this study.
3.3 Parameters of the utility function
Since we are focusing on short-run decisions regarding allocation of time and
money, we use total household expenditure on items that could be regarded
as ﬂexible to represent the budget constraint. The total budget over the 12-
week summer irrigation period was based on a representative weekly budget.
Itemised data on household expenditure (Australian Bureau of Statistics
2005) was used to distinguish between variable weekly expenditure and long-
term and durable items including housing and utilities, furniture, clothing
and insurance.
To  calibrate the utility function, we assume a nested Cobb–Douglas
functional form as follows:
(11)
The parameter γ was based on the ratio of the value of leisure time to ‘full
income’ that is the sum of leisure time plus cash expenditure. The value of
time for an individual in a given situation is conditioned by what activities
are being traded-off (Cesario 1976), In travel cost land transportation literature
the value of travel time is generally taken to be equal to one-third the average
wage rate (as reported in the US census and cited in Cesario 1976). However,
Larsen and Shaikh (2004) provide evidence to suggest that the value of recre-
ation time is largely independent of the wage rate, and reported a mean value
of recreation time to be around 50 per cent of the mean wage rate. Other
empirical studies of resource allocation have estimated out-of-home leisure
time to be nearly equal to the wage rate (e.g. Kato and Axhausen 2005). One
of the major differences between leisure studies, which usually apply to
‘weekends’ or ‘holiday’ time, and this study is that households will be
required to water lawns in limited time available on weekday evenings if they
UG O L    (   ) . =⋅
− − αα γγ 1 1252 D. Brennan et al.
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are to obtain the greenness they require in the presence of sprinkler bans,
thus their opportunity cost of time may be higher than revealed in empirical
recreation studies. On the other hand, some households may view hand-
watering as a pleasurable activity. We explore the implication of value of time
using sensitivity analysis, by multiplying the mean wage rate by 33, 50 and
100 per cent.
The total time available was based on a daily amount of four hours multiplied
by the length of the evaluation period, being the 90 days of peak summer
(December to February) conditions. The estimate of 4 h per person day is
based on an allowance of 9 h for working and commuting, 8 h for sleeping
and 3 h for other obligatory activities. We assume two persons per house-
hold, giving us a total time of 720 h over the summer. When restrictions are
in place, we assume that households allocated labour to watering garden beds
(total requirement being 25  h over the summer under complete sprinkler
bans) before any time is allocated to watering lawns. This is because perennial
plants in garden beds are likely to die without water, incurring high replace-
ment costs, whereas the impacts on lawns are short-term loss of greenness,
which can be recovered subsequently by applying irrigation.
To  represent three different levels of ‘greenness preference’ we calibrated
the utility function for three baseline water consumption/greenness levels.
Nancarrow  et al. (2002) found that 60 per cent of Perth householders
watered every second day in the absence of restrictions, 16 per cent watered
every day and 23 per cent watered twice per week or less. Based on standard
watering times these frequencies correspond to 50, 75 and 25 per cent of Epan,
denoted as ‘typical’, high greenness and low greenness preferences, respectively.
From the greenness production function we can ﬁnd the corresponding level
of greenness for the calibration of the utility function for each type of con-
sumer, as shown in Figure 2. It can be noted that at the 75 per cent Epan level,
Figure 2 Calibration of baseline pReferences.Welfare costs of sprinkler restrictions 253
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the slope of the greenness production function is very ﬂat implying that if
householders are properly informed about the shape of this function, they
must have very inelastic preferences for greenness. The parameter value α in
the utility function was determined empirically to return the baseline choice
sets. The utility function parameters, as well as other key assumptions, are
reported in Table 1.
The model was calibrated in Excel, and the utility-maximising response to
water restrictions in terms of water use, greenness, and consumption of other
goods and leisure was determined using the Excel Solver. A range of different
restrictions levels was analysed. From a current policy perspective the two
main levels of water restrictions that were of interest were the current mild
restrictions, which allow sprinklers to be used two days per week, and a
complete sprinkler ban, which only permits hand-held watering. Having
solved for the optimal response to the restriction we calculate the welfare cost
as the compensating variation, the level of income that would be required to
make the consumer indifferent to the demand management policy and the
‘no restrictions’ case. However, since the regulated water utility would be
required to pass any excess revenue back to the consumer, we also calculate
the net welfare effect assuming the excess revenue is handed back in a lump
sum payment to each consumer in proportion to the excess of their bill relative
to the unrestricted case.
4. Results
4.1 An illustration of the leisure–greenness substitution choice
The nature of the trade-offs associated with sprinkler restrictions are illustrated
in Figure 3, using the case of ‘typical preferences’ and a time cost of 50 per cent
Figure 3 Illustration of the substitution effects associated with sprinkler restrictions, case of
typical greenness preferences, time cost is 50 per cent of wage rate.254 D. Brennan et al.
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of the wage rate. Moving from the right to the left of the ﬁgure, the amount
of sprinkler watering permitted is reduced from the unconstrained level to a
complete sprinkler ban. The impact on lawn greenness and welfare is shown.
As water application is reduced, greenness declines and the welfare cost of
restrictions increases. As the welfare cost begins to increase at an increasing
rate there is a point where hand-watering becomes preferable to continued
reduction in lawn greenness. This switching point is better illustrated in
Figure  4, which compares the welfare cost and greenness associated with
sprinkler bans with the case where hand-watering substitution is not permitted.
The dashed lines in Figure 4 show the baseline case where substitution for
hand-watering is possible. The solid lines indicate the greenness and welfare
impacts that would arise if hand-watering was also banned. Greenness
continues to fall as sprinkler use is restricted, rather than plateauing as in
the case where substitution is permitted. This leads to a signiﬁcantly higher
welfare loss.
4.2 Effect of different assumptions on the substitution response and efﬁcacy of 
the policy
The nature of the consumer problem was demonstrated using a utility func-
tion calibrated for the average consumer and using a time cost of 50 per cent
of the wage rate. The impact of alternative assumptions on the substitution
response associated with water restrictions is demonstrated graphically in
Figures 5 and 6. The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows the impact of preferences on water
use, where preferences refer to different calibration points associated with
high, typical and low baseline water use on lawns. Those consumers who are
currently practicing high water-application rates will substitute hand-watering
Figure 4 The effect of hand-watering on welfare and greenness.Welfare costs of sprinkler restrictions 255
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when moderate sprinkler restrictions are in place, in order to maintain a high
standard of lawn greenness. They also use substantially more water during a
sprinkler ban, applied by hand. Those who reveal a very low preference for
greenness via low baseline water application are unlikely to substitute any
hand-watering when restrictions are in place. In the case of a total sprinkler
ban they simply give up watering and let their lawns go completely brown.
Consumers with preferences that we believe are most typical of the Perth
consumer are likely to substitute hand-held watering when complete sprinkler
bans are in place, but not when they are permitted to use sprinklers two days
Figure 5 Impact of preferences on substitution of hand-held watering, for two restrictions
policies compared to unrestricted.
Figure 6 Impact of leisure time costs (% wage rate) on substitution of hand-held watering,
for two restrictions policies compared to unrestricted.256 D. Brennan et al.
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per week. For this typical consumer, there is very little additional reduction
in water use associated with upgrading from a two day policy to a complete
sprinkler ban.
The effect of alternative assumptions regarding time cost is illustrated in
Figure 6. As would be expected the amount of substitution for hand-watering
is reduced as the time cost increases. At the very low time cost of 33 per cent
of the wage rate, a ﬁgure typically used in recreation studies, there is a very
small substitution of hand-watering under the two days per week sprinkler
policy.
4.3 Welfare impacts of sprinkler restrictions policies
More detail regarding the welfare costs and effectiveness of pricing and
sprinkler restrictions policies, and the inﬂuence of preferences on these costs,
is shown in Table 2. The percentage reduction in water use is smaller for
consumers with high preferences for greenness and the welfare impact of
sprinkler bans is substantially larger than for the ‘typical’ preference set. For
example, the cost of a sprinkler ban is estimated to be #1590 when time is
valued at 50 per cent of the mean wage rate. However, as noted previously,
the calibration point for this consumer was at the very ﬂat component of the
production function indicating extremely high preference for greenness, which
could in fact be the result of ignorance regarding the productivity of water.
Table 2 Impact of preferences on welfare cost and efﬁciency of policies
Water use (kL) Water reduction (%) Net welfare cost (#)
1. ‘Typical preferences’, time cost 50% wage rate
Unrestricted 92
2 days per week 58 36 67
Ban 53 42 487
2. ‘High preference’, time cost 50% wage rate
Unrestricted 138
2 days per week 103 25 664
Ban 103 25 1590
3. ‘Low preference’, time cost 50% wage rate
Unrestricted 45
2 days per week 45 0 48
Ban 0 100 19
4. ‘Typical preference’, time cost 33% wage rate
Unrestricted 92
2 days per week 60 35 66
Ban 59 36 347
5. ‘Typical preference’, time cost 100% wage rate
Unrestricted 92
2 days per week 58 36 67
Ban 47 49 871Welfare costs of sprinkler restrictions 257
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The inﬂuence of time costs on the response to, and welfare costs of sprinkler
restrictions is also shown in Table 2. Under a complete sprinkler ban, there is
less substitution for hand-watering as time costs increase, and a larger net
impact on welfare. These welfare costs range from #347 per household when
time costs are lowest, to #871 per household when time is measured at the
full wage rate.
Because there is no substitution for hand-held watering at the time costs of
50 and 100 per cent under a two-sprinkler-day per week policy, the water use
and welfare impacts are the same for all these cases. The small substitution
for watering in the case of a consumer with a time cost of 33 per cent of the
wage rate means that they can mitigate the welfare impact slightly.
It can be noted that Perth consumers in some areas can access groundwater
using backyard bores which costs between #2500 and #10  000 to install
depending largely on depth to water and once installed cost only 4 cents/kL
to run compared to spending 91 cents for scheme water (Lieb et al. 2007).
Their analysis indicates that for conventionally sized lots there are economic
gains to the household from adopting a bore technology before the beneﬁts
of avoiding sprinkler restrictions are considered. In areas where bores are
more costly to install, the results presented here indicate that preferences for
greenness and willingness to pay to avoid restrictions may be sufﬁcient to
induce adoption especially for those with a high greenness preference.
4.4 Impact of efﬁciency of hand-watering on results
There are a number of reasons why a restriction policy may impose technical
inefﬁciencies on the system. For example, the current sprinkler restrictions
used in Perth are implemented by assigning permitted watering days (two per
week) according to the street number of the property. However, Colmer and
Short’s (2001) experimental data used to support the present study suggests
that the same total amount of water, applied more frequently in smaller
quantities, may have higher productivity. Similarly, there may be differences
in the application efﬁciency of different watering methods. Poor uniformity
of application associated with hand-held watering may result in over applica-
tion of water in some areas, and under application in others, requiring more
water to establish the same level of greenness. Whilst the technical efﬁciency
of alternative mandated outdoor watering regimes is beyond the scope of this
paper, the general principles can be demonstrated by examining the impact of
a sprinkler restriction policy where technical efﬁciency of hand-held watering
is lower than for sprinklers. Results shown in Figure 7 compared the baseline,
where efﬁciency is 75 per cent for both sprinkler and hose; with the case where
hand-held watering is assumed to be less efﬁcient (assuming 60 per cent efﬁciency).
Figure 7(a) demonstrates the impact of the hand-held water application
efﬁciency on the response to sprinkler restrictions. Whilst the point at which
watering commences is deferred slightly, the less efﬁcient system results in a
higher rate of hand-watering as sprinkler use is further reduced. The welfare258 D. Brennan et al.
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Figure 7 (a) Impact of watering efﬁciency on hand-held watering response. (b) Relationship
between greenness and compensating variation, for two hand-held watering efﬁciency assumptions.
(c) Welfare cost and water saved from water restrictions, two different hand-watering efﬁciency
assumptions.Welfare costs of sprinkler restrictions 259
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impact associated with the two policies, expressed as a function of greenness,
is shown in Figure 7(b). The less efﬁcient system also results in lower green-
ness, and imposes a higher welfare cost on the consumer as they attempt to
make up for the lower water productivity by increasing watering time. The
relationship between the welfare impact and the total amount of water saved
from the policy is shown in Figure 7(c). As the sprinkler restrictions become
more severe, water savings are achieved up until the point where it becomes
optimal to substitute for hand-watering. Beyond this point, the main impact
of tightening the restriction level is to cause a welfare loss associated with
reduced leisure time; but in the case of the less efﬁcient hand-watering scenario,
the substitution for hand-held watering actually leads to a policy failure –
less water is saved at a higher cost to the consumer.
5. Conclusions, limitations and extensions
Stated preference techniques have been used previously to assess willingness
to pay to avoid restrictions. We have presented an alternative approach which
makes use of knowledge about the relationship between watering and lawn
quality, and demonstrates the nature of the trade-offs between sprinkler,
hand-held watering and leisure time. This has allowed us to explore the
factors that affect not just the welfare cost of outdoor water restrictions, but
also their efﬁcacy. We showed that the preferences towards lawn greenness,
and the time cost, or disutility associated with hand-held watering, will inﬂuence
the extent to which a sprinkler restrictions policy is effective. For example, we
have estimated that the household welfare costs of a sprinkler restriction
appear to be less than #100 per season when mild (two days per week) sprinkler
restrictions are in place, and may range between #347 and #870 per season
when a complete sprinkler ban is in place, over the range of estimates we
examined for the opportunity cost of time. The associated water savings are
around 36 per cent of current consumption for the mild restrictions, com-
pared to only 42 per cent when a complete sprinkler ban is in place.
Given the fact that lawn irrigation is the largest single type of water
demand in many Australian urban contexts, and that the reliability of
supplying this demand is used to determine the timing of future supply
augmentation, further investigation of preferences for and efﬁcacy of outdoor
water policies is warranted. Some of the limitations of our work that could
be investigated in future research include lack of information regarding the
nature of consumer preferences for greenness, lack of evidence on the true
cost of time associated with hand-held watering, and the assumption of
perfect information. Since our approach explicitly examines the productivity
of water in producing greenness, one area where further research may have
policy relevance is in the design of information campaigns to address misin-
formation regarding the productivity of watering technologies and regimes.
We  examined the short-run values associated with sprinkler restrictions
assuming long-term decisions concerning garden layout, lawn size and variety260 D. Brennan et al.
© 2007 The Authors
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and irrigation technology were held constant. However, since our approach
allowed us to incorporate the technical relationship between lawn greenness
and irrigation, it could easily be extended to examine incentives for adoption
of more efﬁcient irrigation technologies and lawn varieties with different
water response relationships, as well as the inﬂuence of the risk of sprinkler
bans on such investment decisions. The basic concept behind the approach is
that water is an intermediate good used by householders to produce con-
sumption goods, and this concept might also have application in the study of
technology adoption that affects water use inside the home.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the CSIRO Water for a Healthy Country Flagship.
References
ACTEW Corporation (2004). An Assessment of the Need to Increase the ACT’s Water
Storage December 2004, Future Water Options for ACT Region in the 21st Century
Report. Available from URL: http://www.actew.com.au/futurewateroptions/documents/
assessmentReport.pdf [accessed 3rd October 2006].
Aronsson, T., Daunfeldt, S. and Wikstrom, M. (2001). Estimating intra-household allocation in
a collective model with household production, Journal of Population Economics 14, 569–584.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2005). Household Expenditure Survey for 2003/4 Summary
of Results, Catalogue number 6530.0 WA Data, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.
Australian Research Centre for Water in Society (2002). Perth Domestic Water Use Study:
Household Appliance Ownership and Community Attitudinal Analysis 1999–2000. CSIRO
Land and Water, Perth.
Cesario, F.J. (1976). Value of time in recreation beneﬁt studies, Land Economics 52, 32–41.
Colmer, T.D. and Short, D.C. (2001). Reducing Water Use by Turf Grasses in a Mediterranean
Environment: Evaluation of Diverse Species. Final Report to Horticulture Australia for Project
Number TU96002, University of Western Australia, Crawley.
Connellan, G. (2002). Efﬁcient Irrigation: A Reference Manual for Turf and Landscape.
Available at URL: http://www.southeastwater.com.au [accessed 1st October 2006].
de Janvry, A. and Sadoulet, E. (2001). Income strategies among rural households in Mexico:
the role of off-farm activities, World Development 29, 467–480.
Economic Regulation Authority (2005). Final Report on the Inquiry on Urban Water and
Wastewater Pricing. Economic Regulation Authority, Perth.
Garcia-Valinas, M. (2006). Analysing rationing policies: drought and its effects on urban
users’ welfare, Applied Economics 38, 955–965.
Gordon, J., Chapman, R. and Blamey, R. (2001). Assessing the options for the Canberra
water supply: an application of choice modelling, in Bennett, J. and Blamey, R. (eds), The
Choice Modelling Approach to Environmental Valuation. Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar
73–92.
Hensher, D., Shore, N. and Train, K. (2006). Water supply security and willingness to pay to
avoid drought restrictions, Economic Record 82, 56–66.
Kato, H. and Axhausen, K.W. (2005). Valuation of Leisure Time of Non-work Days: Comparative
Discrete-Continuous Analysis. Arbeitsbericht Verkehrs- und Raumplanung, 325, IVT, ETH
Zürich, Zürich.
Kerkhofs, M. and Kooreman, P. (2003). Identiﬁcation and estimation of a class of household
production models, Journal of Applied Econometrics 18, 337–369.Welfare costs of sprinkler restrictions 261
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Larsen, D. and Shaikh, S. (2004). Recreation demand choices and revealed values of leisure
time, Economic Inquiry 42, 264–278.
Lieb, D., Brennan, D. and McFarlane, D. (2007). The Economic Value of Groundwater Used to
Irrigate Lawns and Gardens in the Perth Metropolitan Area. CSIRO Water for a Healthy
Country Report, Perth.
McMahon, T., Finlayson, B., Haines, A. and Srikanthan, R. (1992). Global Runoff –
Continental comparisons of annual ﬂows and peak discharge, Cremlingen-Destedt, Catena
Verlag, West Germany.
Nancarrow, B.E., Kaercher, J.D. and Po, M. (2002). Community Attitudes to Water Restrictions
Policies and Alternative Sources: A Longitudinal Analysis 1988–2002. CSIRO Land and
Water Consultancy Report, Perth.
Nieswiadomy, M. (1992). Estimating urban residential water demand, Effects of Price Structure,
Conservation and Education, Water Resources Research 28, 609–615.
Renwick, M. and Archibald, S. (1998). Demand side management policies for residential water
use: who bears the conservation burden? Land Economics 73, 343–359.
Renwick, M. and Green, R. (2000). Do residential demand side management policies measure
up? An analysis of eight Californian water agencies, Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 40, 37–55.
Schuck, E. and Proﬁt, R. (2004). Evaluating Non-price Water Demand Policies during Severe
Droughts. Selected Paper Prepared for the American Agricultural Economics Association
Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 1–4.
Short, D.C. (2002). Irrigation Requirements and Water-use of Turf Grasses in a Mediterranean-type
Environment. PhD Thesis, University of Western Australia, Perth.
Singh, I., Squire, L. and Strauss, J. (1992). A survey of agricultural household models: recent
ﬁndings and policy implications, Development Economics 2, 144–174.
Water Corporation (2006). Water Wise Calculator. Available at URL: http://www.watercorpo-
ration.com.au/_includes/calculator/calculator.asp [accessed 1st May 2006].